


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WESTERN EUROPE – CANADA – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Approach of Independence For Angola Stirs Unrest
in Portugal

Portuguese leftists are citing the arrest last weekend of two supporters of former president Spinola to justify their claims that a right-wing coup is imminent. 4,5

The two former military officers, who reportedly left the country with Spinola following the abortive coup of March 11, were picked up by security troops at a camp for Angolan refugees in northern Portugal. They were said to have Spanish currency and to have entered Portugal secretly from Spain. The US embassy in Lisbon reports that several individuals with ties to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army may also have been detained. 1,4

Anti-Communist military leaders, including Prime Minister Azevedo, are appealing for calm and unity to cool the unrest stirred by anticipation of Angolan independence next week. An army spokesman yesterday denied leftist-inspired reports that live-fire maneuvers are scheduled for this week. He labeled the story "alarmist" and said such drills could only lead to a coup attempt from the right. 4

General Charais, commander of the central military region, warned the left in an interview last week that any attempt on its part to overthrow the Azevedo government and turn Angola over to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola would spawn a right-wing power play. Charais believes that the left has alienated a substantial portion of the population, creating the conditions for a successful resurgence of the right. 4

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2, 5
The left has been agitating to abandon Lisbon's declared policy of impartiality among the three Angolan liberation movements and to support the Popular Movement, but the Azevedo government does not appear likely to change its neutral posture and further antagonize either the left or the right. In addition to internal pressures from left-wing political parties, the press organs they control, and sympathetic radical military officers, Popular Movement activists are arriving in Lisbon on refugee flights to take part in rallies supporting the Popular Movement. The first is scheduled for tonight.

2, 5
As the airlift of refugees from Angola comes to an end, conservative refugee groups are certain to become bolder in registering their discontent with left-wing support for the Popular Movement as well as insufficient resettlement assistance from the Lisbon government. The bombing and sacking late last month of an Angolan cultural center controlled by the Popular Movement suggests that the returnees do not intend to shy away from violence. To counter the left-wing efforts, they have planned a demonstration against the Popular Movement for later this week.

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1, 4
Despite the political turmoil, the 19-man Revolutionary Council is attempting to carry out business as usual. The Council did not, as rumored, take action against army chief Fabiao or security head Carvalho at its session last weekend. It did, however, approve the long-awaited legal framework for the investigation and trial of nearly 1,300 members of the former regime's security police, who have been detained without charges since the April 1974 coup. The Council also set up a tribunal to deal with persons implicated in the March 11 coup attempt and announced its intention to arrest civilians possessing military arms.

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The anti-Communist members of the Council may have decided to delay plans against Fabiao and Carvalho because of the concerted campaign by left-wing military and civilian groups to equate their removal with rightist plots to take over the government. They may have been further influenced by reports that the radical military police hold arrest orders signed by Carvalho for 500 individuals, including high-ranking anti-Communist officers. Another likely obstacle to the anti-Communists is President Costa Gomes, who has served as the major stumbling block in previous attempts to oust radical officers from high positions. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)

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Spanish Communists Make Concessions on Joint Communique

1 | The Spanish Communist Party has apparently made significant concessions in its bid to create a facade of unity between the two loose coalitions of the Spanish left.

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2 | The joint communique issued Saturday by the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the more moderately leftist Democratic Platform of Convergence failed to condemn Prince Juan Carlos out of hand as the Communists wanted. The communique was also vague on Communist demands for the immediate establishment of a provisional government and the calling of a national referendum to choose between monarchy and republic. The statement called for a "democratic break" with Francoism and referred to a "constituent period" which would lead to a referendum. No deadlines were set for the referendum.

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2 | The three other main "objectives" in the communique were issues on which there is broad agreement among the Spanish opposition:

- Amnesty for political prisoners.
- Freedom for labor unions and political parties and guarantees of human rights.
- Full political rights and "freedoms" for regions.

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2 | The communique closed with the statement that the two coalitions would remain in contact and cooperate from time to time, but would continue to seek their own particular objectives.

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The leaders of the Spanish Communist Party reportedly hope to fuse the Democratic Junta and the Democratic Platform. 3

The leader of the Socialist Workers' Party, Felipe Gonzalez, is opposed to a merger and has reportedly said that cooperation between the two coalitions will be limited to joint declarations on subjects on which the two have mutual interest and agreement. 3

The Communists' immediate aim is probably to head off any effort by Prince Juan Carlos and his new government to isolate the Communists from the non-Communist left. Juan Carlos might seek, for example, to legalize the left of center Christian Democratic and Socialist parties, which make up the bulk of the Democratic Platform. The legalization of the Communist Party is highly unlikely soon, although it may become a central issue during the transition period. 4

Many of the illegal opposition parties distrust the Communists. They cannot afford to oppose legalization of the party, however, for to do so would open them to charges that they had sold out to the regime. They also feel that the status of illegality favors the Communists and that the Party's weaknesses can only be exposed if it is brought out into the open political arena. 1
2

Franco's continuing presence makes it difficult for Juan Carlos to respond adequately to demands from the left. Privately the Prince has indicated a willingness to move ahead with liberalizing measures. but as long as Franco clings to life, ultra-rightists in the government will be able to use him as an excuse for obstruction. The left, meanwhile, will be expecting Juan Carlos to make steps in their direction. If he feels too circumscribed by his unclear position to act decisively, his hesitancy could lead to demonstrations by the left which in turn could provoke a backlash by the right leading to violent confrontations. 1
(SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)

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Dublin's Bipartisan Policy Toward Ulster Cracks

2 | Jack Lynch, leader of the opposition Fianna Fail party in Dublin, last week called upon the British to "implement an ordered withdrawal from involvement" in Ulster. The Fianna Fail statement asked London to continue to subsidize the province during a transition period and reiterated the party's call for eventual unification through peaceful means.

2 | The move, which coincides with the emergence of strains in bipartisan British policy toward Ulster, may reflect a challenge to Lynch by the party's right-wing leader, shadow health minister Charles Haughey. Haughey was nearly sacked by Lynch for gun running for the Provisional IRA in 1971, but he has since worked himself back to the front bench. The statement reportedly came after a bitter debate in the party's parliamentary delegation and a close vote engineered by Haughey.

3 | Although Dublin's coalition government still supports the current British plan for creating a power-sharing government in Ulster, a resurgence of right-wing authority within the Irish opposition bodes ill for a political solution. Moderate as well as hardline Protestants in the north will interpret the Fianna Fail statement as confirmation of Dublin's inherent desire to annex the province.

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Protestant militants will be faced with an agonizing decision if the British withdrawal concept gains widespread acceptance, which seems likely. If reason prevails--and there is little in the records to suggest that it will--the loyalists might seek an interim compromise solution that involves sharing some important governmental functions with Catholic political leaders. The ugly alternative might be a large military campaign by loyalists to secure areas in Ulster that have heavy concentrations of Protestant population, hoping to keep these areas free of Dublin's administration, at least for a while. (SECRET NOFORN)

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French Communist-Socialist Quarrel Heating
Up Again

1 | The credibility of the left alliance has
| been further damaged by the growing intensity
| of French Communist criticism of the Socialists
| in the last few days. The alliance has already
| been seriously undermined by the public squabbling
| between the two parties over the past year and,
| most recently, by the decision of their junior
| partner, the left Radicals, to open a dialogue
| with the government. If the two major left
3 | parties do not begin soon to patch up their differ-
| ences, the alliance will not be able to present a
| credible alternative to the voters in the municipal
| elections in 1977--or even to survive on paper
| that long.

1/3 | The Communist leaders have noted a steady
| decrease in the votes their party has drawn in
| by-elections over the last year and a concomitant
| increase in Socialist votes. The Communists con-
| clude that Socialist inroads into previously Com-
| munist blocs of support will lead to their perman-
| ent replacement as the major left party and spokes-
| man of the workers. The Communists also see them-
| selves losing to the Socialists what little appeal
| they had among the uncommitted voters and have
| no hope for improvement before the municipal elec-
| tions. Consequently, the party's commitment to
| the alliance's common program is in question and
| the leadership may well be thinking of returning
| to a policy of go-it-alone opposition to the
| government which would at least calm restless
| members who have been uncomfortable with the
| alliance. Party chief Georges Marchais, who is
| closely associated with the alliance policy--and

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who may not be fully recovered from a heart attack suffered last January--could be replaced. He has never enjoyed wide popularity within the party. 11/3

The Communists do not want to break the alliance themselves, and their recent attacks may be designed to spur the Socialists into making the break. Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand has consistently refused to respond in kind, however, and has thereby strengthened his image as a statesman. He also does not want to bear the blame for breaking the alliance. By remaining silent, however, the party leaders are irritating the Socialist rank-and-file--especially in the provinces where the alliance is not popular--who are beginning to expect a more aggressive stance from their leadership. Moreover, the party could lose ground among the center and uncommitted voters who want to see a clear distinction between the Socialists and the Communists. 1

The Communist-Socialist debate has also affected relations between the two largest labor organizations. The Socialist-leaning CFDT leaders last week heard a report that charged that the left alliance is now no more than a formality and that the two parties are exploiting their differences to gain votes but are ignoring the workers' interests. The report marked the first explicit statement by a member of the opposition that the quarreling has undermined the alliance's ability to present itself as a credible alternative to the government majority. 2

The Communist-dominated CGT, like its sponsor, is concerned about losing its dominant role on the left. In the last few weeks the confederation has indicated it will act independently of the CFDT when it believes it can reinforce its position among the workers by doing so. The more the Communist party seems to be losing ground to the 2

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2 | Socialists, the more compelled the CGT will be to assert its majority position in organized labor in order to strengthen the party's claim to represent the workers.

2 | For its part, the CFDT is likely to find it expedient to follow Mitterrand's lead in trying to play down the squabbling. Both unions in fact have a greater immediate need than the two parties to maintain at least a minimum level of cooperation or they will lose even more of their already weakened ability to get the workers into the streets to protest government policies. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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